Cross-border tax evasion after the common reporting standard: Game over?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Casi, Elisa; Spengel, Christoph; Stage, Barbara M. B.
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104240
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: tax evasion; Automatic exchange of information; tax havens; Cross-border deposits

摘要

We study the short-term effect of the first global multilateral standard for the automatic exchange of information (AEOI), the so-called Common Reporting Standard (CRS), on cross-border tax evasion. Employing newly available bilateral data on cross-border deposits, we find that the CRS induced a reduction of 11.5% in cross-border deposits parked in tax havens. However, despite the 4000 bilateral information exchange relations created under the CRS, deposit relocation is still an option for secrecy-seeker. We find that the United States, which did not commit to the CRS, emerges as an attractive location for cross-border deposits. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.