Persistence of power: Repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Agranov, Marina; Cotton, Christopher; Tergiman, Chloe
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Queens University - Canada; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104126
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: stationary equilibrium; Dynamic bargaining; repeated games; laboratory experiment

摘要

We extend a simple repeated, multilateral bargaining model to allow successful agenda setters to hold on to power as long as they maintain the support of a majority of other committee members. Theoretically and experimentally, we compare this Endogenous Power environment with a standard Random Power environment in which agenda setters are appointed randomly each period. Although the theoretical analysis predicts that the two environments are outcome equivalent, the experimental analysis shows substantial differences in behavior and outcomes across the games. The Endogenous Power environment results in the formation of more stable coalitions, less-equitable budget allocations, the persistence of power across periods, and higher long-run inequality than the Random Power environment. We present evidence that the stationary equilibrium refinements traditionally used in the literature fail to predict behavior in either game. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.