A simple dynamic climate cooperation model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kovac, Eugen; Schmidt, Robert C.
• 署名单位: University of Duisburg Essen; Fern University Hagen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104329
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Climate treaty; coalition; Dynamic game; COORDINATION; delay

摘要

We introduce a novel framework for analyzing coalition formation, applied to climate cooperation. Our model allows for multiple rounds of negotiations and is able to explain the formation of large coalitions. The incentive of each coalition member to join and subsequently to sign a long-term contract is to prevent inefficient delay that arises as soon as a single country deviates. This undermines the free-rider incentive that destabilizes large coalitions in static coalition formation games. The equilibrium coalition size is then determined by a threshold effect due to which deviations of coalition members become unprofitable for sufficiently large coalitions. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.