Efficient policy interventions in an epidemic

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bisin, Alberto; Gottardi, Piero
• 署名单位: New York University; University of Essex; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104444
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Epidemic; externalities; Infection rights; Pigouvian taxes

摘要

In the context of an epidemic, a society is forced to face a system of externalities in consumption and in production. Command economy interventions can support efficient allocations at the cost of severe infor-mation requirements. Competitive markets for infection rights (alternatively, Pigouvian taxes) can guar-antee efficiency without requiring direct policy interventions on socio-economic activities. We demonstrate that this is the case also with moral hazard, when the infections cannot be associated to the specific activities which originated them. Finally, we extend the analysis to situations where govern-ments have only incomplete information regarding the values of the parameters of the infection or of firms' production. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.