Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andina-Diaz, Ascension; Feri, Francesco; Melendez-Jimenez, Miguel A.
• 署名单位: Universidad de Malaga; University of London; Royal Holloway University London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104532
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Gradual policy implementation; endogenous status quo; Political alternation; polarization; Moderation; EFFICIENCY; Robustness

摘要

This paper presents a novel explanation for political alternation in democracies, rooted in the benefit for the median voter of keeping policy from drifting too far to either extreme. Central to this argument is the idea that policy change is gradual and that this gradualism depends on the institutional flexibility/rigidity of the country. Built on this idea, we propose a model of dynamic elections and show that institutional rigidities cause alternation. We also show that, though institutional rigidities prevent governments from implementing extreme policies, they incentivize parties to polarize as much as they can. However, more flexible institutions can foster moderation. Last, we analyze the resilience of equilibrium policies to players' impatience and discuss extensions of our model, including office-motivated parties, the cost of alternation, alternation every two terms, and asymmetric policies. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.