Can judiciaries constrain executive power? Evidence from judicial reforms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chemin, Matthieu
• 署名单位: McGill University; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104428
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Judicial reforms; Constraints on the executive

摘要

An accessible, swift and unbiased legal system may constrain the executive by limiting expropriation and the misuse of public office for private gain. I test this hypothesis by assembling a database of judicial reforms supported by foreign aid. To address the endogenous placement of these reforms, I implement a within-country identification strategy comparing groups more or less connected to the executive. I find that judicial reforms disproportionately benefit the powerless and discriminated groups of society. Their perception that the president will never ignore the courts and laws is lower at baseline by 11 percentage points compared to other more connected groups in society, and it differentially increases by 10 percentage points after a judicial reform, nearly closing the gap between groups. CO 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V.