Optimal tax systems with endogenous behavioral biases

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moore, Dylan T.; Slemrod, Joel
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104384
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: taxation; behavioral economics; Optimal tax

摘要

We develop an optimal tax framework that combines two recent extensions of tax analysis: a tax-systems emphasis on non-rate policy instruments, and a recognition of the role of behavioral biases. Although the implications of taxpayers' biases for optimal tax rates have received considerable attention, a complete analysis of this aspect of optimal tax theory must account for the fact that such biases are often endogenous to the non-rate aspects of a tax system. We first generalize and extend the analysis of optimal tax systems to incorporate endogenous behavioral biases. We then develop a novel and important application of this issue, showing how misperception of the tax rate affects the optimal breadth of the tax base. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.