Decentralizing corruption: Irrigation reform in Pakistan

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jacoby, Hanan G.; Mansuri, Ghazala; Fatima, Freeha
• 署名单位: The World Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104499
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Rent-seeking; bureaucracy; Elite capture; Landownership inequality

摘要

Does decentralizing the allocation of public resources reduce rent-seeking and improve equity? We study a governance reform in Pakistan's vast Indus Basin irrigation system, where corruption is endemic. Using canal discharge measurements across Punjab province from 2006 to 2014, we find that water theft increased on channels taken over by local farmer organizations compared to those that remained bureaucratically managed, reducing agricultural surplus and substantially redistributing wealth from downstream to upstream landowners. Water theft increased by more along channels with relatively larger (more influential) upstream landowners, suggesting that the political-economy context is critical to the success, or lack thereof, of decentralization. (C) 2021 The World Bank. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.