Pareto-improving minimum corporate taxation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hebous, Shafik; Keen, Michael
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Tokyo; Universite Clermont Auvergne (UCA); University of Oxford; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104952
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Tax competition; Minimum taxation; Corporate tax reform; international taxation

摘要

The international agreement on a minimum effective corporate tax rate, implementation of which is imminent, marks a profound change in global tax arrangements. The appropriate level of that minimum, however, has been, and remains, extremely contentious. This paper explores the strategic responses to a minimum tax, which - the policy objective being to change the rules of the tax competition game - are critical for assessing the design and welfare impact of this fundamental policy innovation. Analysis and calibration plausibly suggest sizable scope for minima that are Pareto-improving, benefiting low tax countries as well as high, relative to the uncoordinated equilibrium.