Where does opportunity knock? On doors that voted for the executive

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shelton, Cameron A.
• 署名单位: Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont McKenna College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104961
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Opportunity zones; Dual constituency hypothesis

摘要

The Trump Tax Bill of 2017 gave U.S. state governors a one-time opportunity to select an exogenously fixed number of census tracts for preferential tax treatment. We model a governors' choice of tracts to maximize competing goals of mobilizing voters, rewarding co-partisan legislators, and alleviating poverty. We estimate the likelihood that an eligible tract is selected as a function of both the economic characteristics of the tract and the political characteristics of the governor and the relevant state and federal legislators. Our results show that the executive accountability engendered by eligibility for reelection is weakened by the dual constituency hypothesis.