News credibility and the quest for clicks☆

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kawamura, Kohei; Quement, Mark T. Le
• 署名单位: Waseda University; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.105005
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Cheap talk; strategic information transmission; media; Markovian processes

摘要

We examine a model of dynamic communication by a media outlet. In each period, the uninformed public can consult the outlet's report at a cost. The outlet, which is primarily driven by profit maximization, has an incentive to induce uncertainty in order to encourage future consultation and thereby generate revenue. In an intermediate cost range, the public and the outlet may be worse off with a cheaper cost of access since it leads the outlet to distort information more, by making the public's future consultation decision more responsive to the current report.