Intergovernmental Conflict and Censorship: Evidence from China's Anti-Corruption Campaign

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhuang, Maiting
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvac036
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2540-2585
• 关键词: media bias; GOVERNMENT; coverage; IMPACT

摘要

I study how local Chinese newspapers report on the national anti-corruption campaign by collecting a large-scale dataset of newspaper articles, internet searches, and comments on social media. Despite greater reader interest, local newspapers underreport, and deemphasise corruption scandals involving high-level officials from their own province. Underreporting is greater when a corrupt official is well connected, and a newspaper does not rely on advertising revenue. City-level newspapers report less about corruption in their own city but are more likely to report about corruption within the provincial government. I present suggestive evidence that this type of localised censorship reduces the accountability of local governments.