MARKET DISTORTIONS WHEN AGENTS ARE BETTER INFORMED: THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levitt, Steven D.; Syverson, Chad
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest.90.4.599
• 发表日期: 2008-11
• 页码: 599-611
• 关键词: Incentives; experts; equity; time

摘要

Agents are often better informed than the clients who hire them and may exploit this informational advantage. Real estate agents have an incentive to convince clients to sell their houses too cheaply and too quickly. We test these predictions by comparing home sales in which real estate agents are hired to when an agent sells his own home. Consistent with the theory, we find homes owned by real estate agents sell for 3.7% more than other houses and stay on the market 9.5 days longer, controlling for observables. Greater information asymmetry leads to larger distortions.