Endogenous preferential treatment in centralized admissions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chiu, Y. Stephen; Weng, Weiwei
• 署名单位: University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00064.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 258-282
• 关键词: 2-sided matching markets; school choice; boston mechanism; incentives; STABILITY; DESIGN

摘要

We study a model of centralized admissions in which schools are allowed to pre-commit to admitting qualified applicants who rank them as their top choices over more qualified applicants who do not. A less popular school may use the pre-commitment to steal applicants who otherwise would not choose it as their top choice (the stealing motive); a popular school may use the pre-commitment to prevent its own applicants from being stolen (the preemptive motive). We identify the conditions for these two motives to exist. We also clarify the relationship of this phenomenon with that of pre-arrangement of school places.