Coordination and delay in hierarchies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Patacconi, Andrea
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00061.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 190-208
• 关键词: information; decentralization; firm; ORGANIZATION; TECHNOLOGY; incentives; COSTS; MODEL

摘要

This article studies hierarchical organizations where concerns for fast execution are important and employees must be coordinated to avoid wasteful duplications of effort. Simple conditions are provided for the time spent on coordinating subordinates to be increasing and the span of control to be decreasing as one goes up the hierarchy, with equalities holding if delay is all that matters. When returns to specialization are substantial, the span of control also tends to widen and the hierarchy to flatten as urgency increases. The model suggests that concerns for fast execution may be key in explaining recent trends toward decentralization and delayering in firms.