INSURERS' NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE AND THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF MEDICARE PART D

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lakdawalla, Darius; Yin, Wesley
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00463
• 发表日期: 2015-05
• 页码: 314-331
• 关键词: choice; prices

摘要

By influencing the size and bargaining power of private insurers, public subsidization of private health insurance may project effects beyond the subsidized population. We test for such spillovers by analyzing how increases in insurer size resulting from the implementation of Medicare Part D affected drug prices negotiated in the non-Medicare commercial market. On average, Part D lowered prices for commercial enrollees by 3.7 percentage. The external commercial market savings amount to $1.5 billion per year, which, if passed to consumers, approximates the internal cost savings of newly insured subsidized beneficiaries. If retained by insurers, it corresponds to a greater than 9.25 percentage average increase in profitability on stand-alone drug insurance.