ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICAL CAPTURE, AND SELECTION INTO POLITICS: EVIDENCE FROM PERUVIAN MUNICIPALITIES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Artiles, Miriam; Kleine-Rueschkamp, Lukas; Leon-Ciliotta, Gianmarco
• 署名单位: Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD); Barcelona School of Economics; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00906
• 发表日期: 2021-05
• 页码: 397-411
• 关键词: regression discontinuity designs; ECONOMY; POLICY; MODEL; COMPETITION; recall; audits; rules

摘要

We estimate the effects of political accountability on the selection of politicians when accountability mechanisms are prone to political capture. We compare the characteristics of candidates running in municipalities where the previous incumbent was ousted from office through a recall referendum with those who run where the recall referendum failed by a small margin. Having a recalled incumbent in the previous term causes a negative selection of candidates in terms of their education and previous experience. They are also less representative of indigenous groups. The results are driven by localities where the accountability institution is likely used for political purposes.