The Dynamic Electoral Returns of a Large Antipoverty Program

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zimmermann, Laura
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00935
• 发表日期: 2021-12
• 页码: 803-817
• 关键词: political budget cycles; voters respond; manipulation; CORRUPTION; inference; transfers; designs

摘要

Governments around the world use short-term reelection strategies. This is problematic if governments can maximize their reelection chances by prioritizing short-term spending before an election over long-term reforms. This paper tests whether longer program exposure has a causal effect on election outcomes in the context of a large antipoverty program in India. Using a regression-discontinuity framework, the results show that length of program exposure lowers electoral support for the government. The paper discusses a couple of potential explanations, finding that the most plausible mechanism is that voters hold the government accountable for the program's implementation quality.