The Race Between Deterrence and Displacement: Theory and Evidence from Bank Robberies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maheshri, Vikram; Mastrobuoni, Giovanni
• 署名单位: University of Houston System; University of Houston; University of Turin; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00900
• 发表日期: 2021-07
• 页码: 547-562
• 关键词: crime evidence; reduce crime; police; externalities; PROTECTION; MODEL

摘要

Security measures that deter crime may unwittingly displace it to neighboring areas, but evidence of displacement is scarce. We exploit precise information on the timing and locations of all Italian bank robberies and security guard hirings over a decade to estimate deterrence and displacement effects of guards. A guard lowers the likelihood a bank is robbed by 35% to 40%. Over half of this reduction is displaced to nearby unguarded banks. Theory suggests optimal policy to mitigate this spillover is ambiguous. Our findings indicate restricting guards in sparse, rural markets and requiring guards in dense, urban markets could be socially beneficial.