Mission and the Bottom Line: Performance Incentives in a Multigoal Organization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gine, Xavier; Mansuri, Ghazala; Shrestha, Slesh A.
• 署名单位: The World Bank; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01001
• 发表日期: 2022-07
• 页码: 748-763
• 关键词: financial incentives; team incentives; motivation; promoters; CONTRACTS; pay

摘要

We assess the role of monetary incentives in a mission-oriented organization by randomly assigning workers to one of two bonus schemes, incentivizing either the performance of a microcredit program (bottom line) or the empowerment of clients (mission). We find that the credit bonus improved credit-related outcomes but undermined the social mission, while the social bonus did not harm the bottom line. These results are consistent with a multitasking model with production spillovers or with prosocial behavior. We show that when mission-related rewards are not feasible, organizations that care about both the mission and the bottom line prefer flat wages to incentives.