Picking strategies in games of cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garcia, Julian; Traulsen, Arne
• 署名单位: Monash University; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0027-14765
• DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2319925121
• 发表日期: 2025-06-24
• 关键词: altruistic punishment; maintain cooperation; indirect reciprocity; social norms; EVOLUTION; selection; DYNAMICS; emergence; LEVEL; go

摘要

Evolutionary game theory (EGT) has been pivotal in the study of cooperation, offering formal models that account for how cooperation may arise in groups of selfish, but simple agents. This is done by inspecting the complex dynamics arising from simple interactions between a few strategies in a large population. As such, the strategies at stake are typically hand-picked by the modeler, resulting in a system with many more individuals in the population than strategies available to them. In the presence of noise and with multiple equilibria, the choice of strategies can considerably alter the emergent dynamics. As a result, model outcomes may not be robust to how the strategy set is chosen, sometimes misrepresenting the conditions required for cooperation to emerge. We propose three principles that can lead to a more systematic choice of the strategies in EGT models of cooperation. These are the inclusion of all computationally equivalent strategies; explicit microeconomic models of interactions, and a connection between stylized facts and model assumptions. Further, we argue that new methods arising in AI may offer a promising path toward richer models. These richer models can push the field of cooperation forward together with the principles described above. At the same time, AI may benefit from connecting to the more abstract models of EGT. We provide and discuss examples to substantiate these claims.