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作者：Maier, Norbert; Ottaviani, Marco
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Northwestern University
摘要：When should principals dealing with a common agent share their individual performance measures about the agent's unobservable effort for producing a public good? In a model with two principals who offer linear incentive schemes, we show that information sharing always increases total expected welfare if the principal who is less informed about the agent's effort also cares more about the agent's output. If the less-informed principal cares somewhat ( but not too much) less than the other princ...
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作者：Ganguli, Jayant Vivek; Yang, Liyan
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Cornell University
摘要：If traders can obtain private information about the payoff and the supply of a stock then there can exist (i) complementarity in information acquisition and (ii) multiple equilibria in the financial and information markets. The additional dimension of supply information increases coordination possibilities in the financial market, leading to multiple equilibria. The existence of two information sources can lead to information acquisition being complementary. The multiplicity of equilibria is s...
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作者：Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; de Marti Beltran, Joan
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We model an organization as a game in which all agents share a common decision problem and some level of coordination is necessary between individual actions. Agents have individual private information concerning the task they have to perform, and they share this private information through pairwise channels of communication. We analyze how this communication pattern, modeled by means of a network structure, affects individual behavior and aggregate welfare. In the unique equilibrium of this B...
