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作者：Janssen, Simon
摘要：This paper uses administrative data to study the relationship between the decentralization of wage bargaining systems and the costs of worker displacement. Specifically, the paper exploits a major reform of the wage bargaining system in the Danish manufacturing sector, a reform that changed the wage-setting process from a highly centralized bargaining system at the national level to a decentralized system with a strong emphasis on firm-level wage bargaining. The results show that under the cen...
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作者：Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Zurich; University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Melbourne
摘要：In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty regarding the good's value. We find that Moore-Repullo mechanisms fail to implement truth-telling in a substantial number of cases even under perfect information about the valuation of the good. Our data further sugge...
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作者：Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Oreffice, Sonia; Quintana-Domeque, Climent
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Surrey; University of Oxford
摘要：We develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are characterized by a continuous trait and a binary attribute. The model incorporates attributes for which there are heterogeneous preferences in the population regarding their desirability, that is, the impact of the traits cannot be summarized by a one-dimensional attractiveness index. We present a general resolution strategy based on optimal control theory, and characterize the stable matching. We then co...
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作者：Gerlagh, Reyer; Liski, Matti
作者单位：Tilburg University; Aalto University
摘要：What are the optimal climate policies when time preferences deviate from the standard exponential discounting and decision makers cannot commit to future policies? We show that, with time-declining discounting, the delay and persistence of climate impacts provide a commitment device to policy makers. We quantify the commitment value in a climate-economy model by solving time-consistent Markov equilibrium capital and emission taxes explicitly. The returns on capital and climate investments are ...
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作者：Alaoui, Larbi; Sandroni, Alvaro
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：This paper relates the secular premise that accumulating wealth is a moral obligation and the religious dogma that salvation is immutable and preordained by God. It thus formalizes Weber's renowned thesis on the connection between the worldly asceticism of Protestants and the religious doctrines of Calvinism. (JEL: D01, D03, D81)
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作者：Bazot, Guillaume
作者单位：Universite Paris-VIII
摘要：This paper proposes a quantitative evaluation of the financial sector from 1950 to 2007 in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Europe more broadly. Three main facts are revealed. First, the ratio of domestic financial intermediaries' income to GDP increases continuously in all the countries over the period, even during the 1990s and the 2000s, contrary to the national accountant evaluation. Second, comparing financial income to the quantity of intermediated assets, the analysis shows that...
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作者：Albornoz, Facundo; Berlinski, Samuel; Cabrales, Antonio
作者单位：University of Nottingham; Inter-American Development Bank; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper studies a model where student effort and talent interact with parental and teachers' investments, as well as with school system resources. The model is rich, yet sufficiently stylized to provide novel implications. It can show, for example, that an improvement in parental outside options will reduce parental and school effort, which are partially compensated through school resources. In this way, by incorporating the behavioral responses of parents, teachers, and policymakers, the p...
