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作者：Hopkins, Ed
作者单位：University of London; King's College London
摘要：This paper analyzes the social dilemma arising when a large population of individuals with differing incomes have concerns over relative deprivation in terms of visible or conspicuous consumption. These relative concerns are cardinal-people care about the size of the gap between own and others' consumption-and include inequity aversion, where negative comparisons are more important than positive, rivalrous preferences, and comparison with mean consumption. The resulting Nash equilibrium is ine...
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作者：Binstok, Noam; Gould, Eric D.; Kaplan, Todd
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Haifa; University of Exeter
摘要：This paper examines the extent to which personal biases affect political views, in the context of how antisemitism influences opinions about Israel. Two empirical analyses are conducted. The first one analyzes social media chatter about Jews and Israel in the UK, revealing a strong, positive relationship between negative chatter about both of them at the daily-location level. In order to establish causality, social media chatter about a Jewish football team in the English Premier League (Totte...
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作者：Jackson, Matthew O.; Xing, Yiqing
作者单位：Stanford University; The Santa Fe Institute; Peking University
摘要：We introduce a model in which people exchange some goods and services informally in their community and others formally on a market. We show that enforcement by informal communities and a formal market are complements: If communities ostracize individuals who are caught cheating on the market, this bolsters incentives to comply with exchanges in both settings. Although transactions within a community generate lower gains from trade than those on the wider market, the enhanced incentives from s...
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作者：Castro-Pires, Henrique
摘要：This paper studies the optimal joint design of incentives and performance rating scales in a principal-manager-worker hierarchy. The principal wants to motivate the worker to exert unobservable effort at the minimum feasible cost. Given the worker's effort, two signals are realized: public and verifiable output and a private non-verifiable signal known only to the manager. The principal may try to elicit the manager's private information by requiring her to evaluate the worker's performance. P...
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作者：Guzzardi, Demetrio; Palagi, Elisa; Roventini, Andrea; Santoro, Alessandro
作者单位：Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna; Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna; University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：This work reconstructs novel series on income distribution in Italy combining survey data, tax data, and National Accounts both at the national and regional levels, and it analyzes the overall progressivity of the tax system. Our new Distributional National Accounts allow to correct for remarkable misreporting of capital income in surveys, to provide more accurate estimates of consumption, and to better account for the role of informal economy. Our fresh estimates show higher income concentrat...
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作者：Illing, Hannah; Schmieder, Johannes; Trenkle, Simon
作者单位：University of Bonn; Boston University; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：We compare men and women who are displaced from similar jobs by applying an event study design combined with propensity score matching and reweighting to administrative data from Germany. After a mass layoff, women's earnings losses are about 35% higher than men's, with the gap persisting 5 years after displacement. This is partly explained by women taking up more part-time employment, but even women's full-time wage losses are almost 50% higher than men's. Parenthood magnifies the gender gap ...
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作者：Hwang, Sung-Ha; Naidu, Suresh; Bowles, Samuel
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); Columbia University; The Santa Fe Institute; University of Siena
摘要：We propose a theory of social norms (or conventions) that implement substantial levels of inequality between men and women, ethnic groups, and classes and that persist over long periods of time despite being inefficient and not supported by formal institutions. Consistent with historical cases, we extend the standard asymmetric stochastic evolutionary game model to allow subpopulation sizes to differ and idiosyncratic rejection of a status quo convention to be intentional to some degree (rathe...
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作者：Ziegler, Andreas G. B.; Romagnoli, Giorgia; Offerman, Theo
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We examine how the erosion of morals, norms, and norm compliance in markets depends on the market power of individual traders. Previously studied markets allow traders to exchange at most one unit and provide market power to individual traders by de-activating two forces: (i) the replacement logic, whereby immoral trading is justified by the belief that others would trade otherwise and (ii) market selection, by which the least moral trader determines aggregate quantities. In an experiment, we ...
