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作者:Bruyneel, Sabrina; Cherchye, Laurens; Cosaert, Sam; De Rock, Bram; Dewitte, Siegfried
作者单位:KU Leuven; KU Leuven; KU Leuven; KU Leuven; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要:We propose a method to quantify other-regarding preferences in group decisions. Our method is based on revealed preference theory. It measures willingness-to-pay for others' consumption and willingness-to-pay for equality in consumption by evaluating consumption externalities in monetary terms. We introduce an altruism parameter and an inequality aversion parameter. Each parameter defines a continuum of models characterized by varying degrees of externalities. We study the empirical performanc...
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作者:Ackerberg, Daniel; Hirano, Keisuke; Shahriar, Quazi
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Osaka; California State University System; San Diego State University
摘要:Buy price auctions merge a posted price option with a standard bidding mechanisms, and have been used by various online auction sites including eBay and General Motors Assistance Corporation. A buyer in a buy price auction can accept the buy price to win with certainty and end the auction early. Intuitively, the buy price option may appeal to bidders who are risk averse or impatient to obtain the good, and a number of authors have examined how such mechanisms can increase the seller's expected...
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作者:Carroll, Christopher; Slacalek, Jiri; Tokuoka, Kiichi; White, Matthew N.
作者单位:Johns Hopkins University; European Central Bank; University of Delaware
摘要:In a model calibrated to match micro- and macroeconomic evidence on household income dynamics, we show that a modest degree of heterogeneity in household preferences or beliefs is sufficient to match empirical measures of wealth inequality in the United States. The heterogeneity-augmented model's predictions are consistent with microeconomic evidence that suggests that the annual marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is much larger than the roughly 0.04 implied by commonly used macroeconomic mo...
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作者:Yang, Chun-Lei; Yao, Lan
作者单位:Nanjing Audit University; Academia Sinica - Taiwan; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要:Prominent models such as maxmin expected utility/alpha-multiprior (MEU/alpha-MP) and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (KMM) interpret ambiguity aversion as aversion against second-order risks associated with ambiguous acts. We design an experiment where the decision maker draws twice with replacement in the typical Ellsberg two-color urns, but with a different color winning each time. Given this set of mean-preserving prospects, MEU/alpha-MP, KMM, and Savage's subjective expected utility all ...
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作者:Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Kim, Ju Hyun
作者单位:Columbia University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要:In this note, we address nonparametric identification of a collective model of household behavior in the presence of additive unobserved heterogeneity in the sharing rule. We show that the (nonstochastic part of the) sharing rule is nonparametrically identified. Moreover, under independence assumptions, individual Engel curves and the random distributions are identified except in special cases (i.e., linear Engel curves).
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作者:Hong, Sok Chul; Lee, Jungmin
作者单位:Seoul National University (SNU); IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要:We examine college students' interaction within classrooms and estimate peer effects on their academic performance. We exploit a unique seating rule at a university in South Korea, known as the fixed-seat system. We propose a novel identification strategy based on students' repeated interaction. Our findings show that a student's performance in a class is significantly influenced by his or her next-seat neighbor's ability. The effect is heterogeneous, varying by student and class characteristi...
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作者:Andrews, Isaiah; Armstrong, Timothy B.
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University
摘要:We derive mean-unbiased estimators for the structural parameter in instrumental variables models with a single endogenous regressor where the sign of one or more first-stage coefficients is known. In the case with a single instrument, there is a unique nonrandomized unbiased estimator based on the reduced-form and first-stage regression estimates. For cases with multiple instruments we propose a class of unbiased estimators and show that an estimator within this class is efficient when the ins...
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作者:Cai, Yongyang; Judd, Kenneth; Steinbuks, Jevgenijs
作者单位:University of Chicago; Stanford University; The World Bank
摘要:This paper introduces a nonlinear certainty-equivalent approximation method for dynamic stochastic problems. We first introduce a novel, stable, and efficient method for computing the decision rules in deterministic dynamic economic problems. We use the results as nonlinear and global certainty-equivalent approximations for solutions to stochastic problems, and compare their accuracy to the common linear and local certainty-equivalent methods. Our examples demonstrate that this method can be a...
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作者:Fox, Jeremy T.; Lazzati, Natalia
作者单位:Rice University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要:We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles (without requiring bundle-specific prices) and of binary games of complete information. We show that these two models are quite similar from an identification standpoint. Moreover, they are mathematically equivalent when we restrict attention to the class of potential games and impose a specific equilibrium selection mechanism in the data generating process. We provide new identification results for the tw...
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作者:Coey, Dominic; Larsen, Bradley; Sweeney, Kane; Waisman, Caio
作者单位:Facebook Inc; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Uber Technologies, Inc.
摘要:We present a partial identification approach for ascending auctions with bidder asymmetries, where bidders' asymmetric types may be unobservable to the econometrician. Our approach yields sharp bounds and builds on and generalizes other recent bounds approaches for correlated private values ascending auctions. When bidder identities are observable, our approach yields tighter bounds than previous approaches that ignore asymmetry, demonstrating that bidder asymmetries can function as an aid rat...