A note on identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fox, Jeremy T.; Lazzati, Natalia
• 署名单位: Rice University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
• 刊物名称: QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1759-7323
• DOI: 10.3982/QE489
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1021-1036
• 关键词: Discrete choice; demand; binary games; identification; bundles; complements; substitutes; entry games; potential games

摘要

We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles (without requiring bundle-specific prices) and of binary games of complete information. We show that these two models are quite similar from an identification standpoint. Moreover, they are mathematically equivalent when we restrict attention to the class of potential games and impose a specific equilibrium selection mechanism in the data generating process. We provide new identification results for the two related models.