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作者：Lemus, Jorge; Temnyalov, Emil
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：We model patent privateeringwhereby producing firms sell patents to Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), which then license them under the threat of litigationin a bargaining game. PAEs can negotiate higher licensing fees than producing firms because they cannot be countersued for infringement. Privateering produces two countervailing effects: it increases the offensive value of patents, whereas it decreases their defensive value and lowers the aggregate surplus of producing firms. Embedding the ...
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作者：Toxvaerd, Flavio
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：I study a multiperiod model of limit pricing under one-sided incomplete information. I characterize pooling and separating equilibria and their existence and determine when these involve limit pricing. For some parameter constellations, the unique equilibrium surviving a D1 type refinement involves immediate separation on monopoly prices. For others, there are limit price equilibria surviving the refinement in which different types may initially pool and then (possibly) separate. Separation in...
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作者：Basso, Leonardo J.; Figueroa, Nicolas; Vasquez, Jorge
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Bank of Canada
摘要：We compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs: fixing either the price or quantity. For each instrument, we consider sophisticated (screening) and simple (bunching) mechanisms. We characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare performance. With unknown demand and increasing marginal costs, the sophisticated price mechanism dominates that of quantity, whereas the sophisticated quantity mechanism may prevail when marginal ...
