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作者：DePiper, Geret; Holzer, Jorge
作者单位：National Oceanic Atmospheric Admin (NOAA) - USA; National Oceanic Atmospheric Admin (NOAA) - USA; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We study incentives to mislabel output in multispecies fisheries managed by tradeable catch shares. Firms can save quota costs by misreporting species harvested, as seen in criminal proceedings against the Codfather. We show that price elasticities for the abundant species reported in the cheating will be higher for compliant than non-compliant firms. Using data from the New England groundfish fishery, we test this prediction using a latent class hedonic price equation to identify compliant ve...
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作者：Breitmoser, Yves; Valasek, Justin
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：This article explores information aggregation and strategic communication in settings where committee members are held accountable, formally or informally, for their individual voting decisions. We show that if decisions are made via majority voting, expressive payoffs introduce a free-rider problem that prevents the committee from communicating truthfully and taking optimal decisions. In contrast, if decisions are made by unanimity, free-riding is mitigated because all agents are responsible ...
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作者：Donna, Javier D.; Pereira, Pedro; Pu, Yun; Trindade, Andre; Yoshida, Renan C.
作者单位：University of Miami; Autoridade da Concorrencia; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Getulio Vargas Foundation; Stanford University
摘要：Cutting out the intermediary and selling directly to consumers is an increasingly common strategy by manufacturers. We develop a structural model of vertical relations where manufacturers bargain with retailers and sell their products directly to consumers. Direct sales generate potential consumer gains due to additional competition and product variety but also increase manufacturers' bargaining leverage, thereby increasing upstream and downstream prices and potentially reducing consumer welfa...
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作者：Bisceglia, Michele; Padilla, Jorge; Perkins, Joe; Piccolo, Salvatore
作者单位：University of Bergamo; University of Bergamo
摘要：In a Cournot industry where firms are privately informed about their marginal costs, raising entry barriers (i.e., imposing strictly positive, but not too large, entry costs) increases expected output, entrants' profits, total welfare, and might benefit consumers. Under Bayes-Cournot competition, firms react to the expectation (conditional on entry) of rivals' costs rather than to their actual costs. This creates scope for entry by relatively inefficient types. Entry costs that prevent these h...
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作者：Wu, Xiaosong; Lewis, Matthew S.; Wolak, Frank A.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Clemson University; Stanford University
摘要：This article estimates a model of optimal search where consumers learn the distribution of gasoline prices during their driving trips. Our model incorporates traffic information and leverages this ordered search environment to recover parameters of the search and learning process using only station-level price and market share data. We find that learning is a crucial component of search in this market. Consumers' prior beliefs regularly deviate from the true price distribution but are updated ...
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作者：Klopack, Ben
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Multi-outlet firms, or chains, account for most US retail spending. This article quantifies the welfare and profit effects of standardized chains in the restaurant industry: chains face higher demand than independents, but are less flexible in customizing product selection or prices across locations. I find that on average chains could earn 19% higher variable profits if they could customize their product optimally, but they would lose 28% of their variable profits if they were to lose their d...
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作者：Garrido, Francisco
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：I show equilibrium existence for a price-setting game among multi-product firms facing a nested logit/CES demand. As opposed to previous research I allow arbitrary firm/nest overlap, making the result relevant for applied work. Additionally, under easy-to-verify conditions, I show that there exist extreme equilibria, which are the most and least preferred by consumers, and provide an algorithm to find them. This allows researcher to numerically verify equilibrium uniqueness in applications, th...
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作者：Strausz, Roland
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：A multi-product monopolist sells sequentially to a buyer who privately learns his valuations. Using big data, the monopolist learns the intertemporal correlation of the buyer's valuations. Perfect price discrimination is generally unattainable-even when the seller learns the correlation perfectly, has full commitment, and in the limit where the consumption good about which the buyer has ex ante private information becomes insignificant. This impossibility is due to informational externalities ...
