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作者:Ambrus, Attila; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位:Harvard University; Princeton University
摘要:This paper analyzes multi-sender cheap talk when the state space might be restricted, either because the policy space is restricted or the set of rationalizable policies of the receiver is not the whole space. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fully-revealing perfect Bayesian equilibrium for any state space. We show that if biases are large enough and are not in similar directions, where the notion of similarity depends on the shape of the state space, then...
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作者:Peski, Marcin
作者单位:University of Chicago
摘要:This paper studies repeated games with incomplete information on one side and equal discount factors for both players. The payoffs of the informed player I depend on one of two possible states of the world, which is known to her. The payoffs of the uninformed player U do not depend on the state of the world (that is, U knows his payoffs), but player I's behavior makes knowledge of the state of interest to player U. We define a finitely revealing equilibrium as a Bayesian perfect equilibrium wh...
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作者:Zhao, Rui R.
作者单位:State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要:This paper studies bilateral trade in which the seller makes a hidden investment that influences the buyer's hidden valuation. In general it is impossible to implement both first-best efficient trade and efficient investment using budget-balanced trading mechanisms. The paper fully characterizes the constrained efficient contracts. It is shown that the optimal tradeoff between allocative efficiency and incentive provision results in rigidity in trade, the degree of which depends on the serious...
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作者:Yang, Huanxing; Ye, Lixin
作者单位:University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要:This paper considers a nonlinear pricing framework with both horizontally and vertically differentiated products. By endogenizing the set of consumers served in the market, we are able to study how increased competition affects nonlinear pricing, in particular the market coverage and quality distortions. We characterize the symmetric equilibrium menu of price-quality offers under different market structures. When the market structure moves from monopoly to duopoly, we show that more types of c...