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作者：Damiano, Ettore; Li Hao; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Hong Kong; University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper considers a model of a rating agency with multiple clients, in which each client has a separate market that forms a belief about the quality of the client after the agency issues a rating. When the clients are rated separately (individual rating), the credibility of a good rating in an inflationary equilibrium of the signaling game is limited by the incentive of the agency to exaggerate the quality of the client. With a centralized rating, the agency rates all clients together and s...
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作者：Pavlov, Gregory
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the players can collude both on the way they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal's opportunities for extracting payments from the agents in such a situation are limited, we show how the asymmetry of information between the colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal is even able ...
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作者：Di Tillio, Alfredo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper extends Savage's subjective approach to probability and utility from decision problems under exogenous uncertainty to choice in strategic environments. Interactive uncertainty is modeled both explicitly, using hierarchies of preference relations, the analogue of beliefs hierarchies, and implicitly, using preference structures, the analogue of type spaces a la Harsanyi, and it is shown that the two approaches are equivalent. Preference structures can be seen as those sets of hierarch...
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作者：Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：A self-proclaimed expert uses past observations of a stochastic process to make probabilistic predictions about the process. An inspector applies a test function to the infinite sequence of predictions provided by the expert and the observed realization of the process in order to check the expert's reliability. If the test function is Borel and the inspection is such that a true expert always passes it, then it is also manipulable by an ignorant expert. The proof uses Martin's theorem about th...
