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作者：Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper considers an auction design framework in which bidders get partial feedback about the distribution of bids submitted in earlier auctions: either bidders are asymmetric but past bids are disclosed in an anonymous way or several auction formats are being used and the distribution of bids, but not the associated formats, is disclosed. I employ the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel 2005) to model such situations. First-price auctions in which past bids are disclosed in an an...
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作者：Fleurbaey, Marc; Roemer, John E.
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Paris Cite; Yale University; Yale University
摘要：Axiomatic bargaining theory (e.g., Nash's theorem) is static. We attempt to provide a dynamic justification for the theory. Suppose a judge or arbitrator must allocate utility in an (infinite) sequence of two-person problems; at each date, the judge is presented with a utility possibility set in R(+)(2). He/she must choose an allocation in the set, constrained only by Nash's axioms, in the sense that a penalty is paid if and only if a utility allocation is chosen at date T that is inconsistent...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Samet, Dov
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Aumann (1976) shows that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E do coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty finite event F with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at F that the agents cannot t...
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作者：Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Boston College
摘要：We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasilinear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the provision costs. The FRP-core is always nonempty in public goods economies but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games. In particul...
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作者：Dizdar, Deniz; Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny
作者单位：University of Bonn; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We analyze maximization of revenue in the dynamic and stochastic knapsack problem where a given capacity needs to be allocated by a given deadline to sequentially arriving agents. Each agent is described by a two-dimensional type that reflects his capacity requirement and his willingness to pay per unit of capacity. Types are private information. We first characterize implementable policies. Then we solve the revenue maximization problem for the special case where there is private information ...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even when school priorities are publicly known and only students can behave strategically, there is a priority structure for which no robustly stable mechanism exists. Our main result shows that there exist...
