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作者：Chen, Yu; Doyle, Matthew; Gonzalez, Francisco M.
作者单位：University of Calgary; University of Waterloo
摘要：We analyze a model in which workers direct their search on and off the job and employer-worker match productivities are private information. Employers can commit neither to post contracts such that wages are a function of tenure nor to disregard counteroffers. In this context, potential employers who do not observe workers' productivity in their current matches use wages as a signal of workers' willingness to switch jobs. In turn, this implies that the wage contracts that employers post in the...
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作者：Nora, Vladyslav; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Nazarbayev University; Lancaster University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We study binary action network games with strategic complementarities. An agent acts if the aggregate social influence of her friends exceeds a transfer levied on the agent by a principal. The principal seeks to maximize her revenue while inducing everyone to act in a unique equilibrium. We characterize optimal transfers showing that agents who are more popular than their friends receive preferential treatment. Our main result is that under mild conditions complete core-periphery networks deli...
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作者：Toomas, Hinnosaar
作者单位：University of Nottingham; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an ear...
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作者：Sun, Yiman
作者单位：Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague
摘要：We study the interaction between an agent of uncertain type, whose project gives rise to both good and bad news, and an evaluator who must decide if and when to fire the agent. The agent can hide bad news from the evaluator at some cost, and will do so if this secures her a significant increase in tenure. When bad news is conclusive, censorship hurts the evaluator, the good agent, and possibly the bad agent. However, when bad news is inconclusive, censorship may benefit all those players. This...
