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作者：Hobson, Jessen L.; Sommerfeldt, Ryan D.; Wang, Laura W.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Washington State University
摘要：We examine the effect of performance-based pay on misreporting intended to benefit a social mission. We show that performance-based pay decreases people's propensity to misreport for a social mission in a not-for-profit setting ( Experiment 1). We similarly show that in a for-profit setting, performance-based pay also decreases misreporting propensity for a social mission, although not for a non-social mission (Experiment 2). Finally, using a framed field experiment with participants attending...
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作者：Brueggen, Alexander; Grabner, Isabella; Sedatole, Karen L.
作者单位：Maastricht University; Vienna University of Economics & Business; Emory University
摘要：Periodic demand forecasts are the primary planning and coordination mechanism within organizations. Because most demand forecasts incorporate human judgment, they are subject to both unintentional error and intentional opportunistic bias. We examine whether a disaggregation of the forecast into various sources of demand reduces forecast error and bias. Using proprietary data from a manufacturing organization, we find that absolute demand forecast error declines following the implementation of ...
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作者：Gipper, Brandon; Hail, Luzi; Leuz, Christian
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Pennsylvania; University of Chicago
摘要：We analyze the effects of partner tenure and mandatory rotation on audit quality, pricing, and production for a large cross-section of U.S. public firms during 2008-2014. On average, we find no evidence that audit quality declines over the tenure cycle and little support for -fresh-look benefits provided by the new audit partner. Audit fees decline and audit hours increase after mandatory rotation, but then reverse over the tenure cycle. We also find evidence that audit firms use shadowing in ...
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作者：Cascino, Stefano; Clatworthy, Mark A.; Garcia Osma, Beatriz; Gassen, Joachim; Imam, Shahed
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bristol; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Humboldt University of Berlin; University of Warwick
摘要：We examine how investment professionals assess the usefulness of financial accounting information depending on their information acquisition objectives and preparers' earnings management incentives. We conduct a survey experiment based on face-to-face interviews with investment professionals and document two main results. First, we find that, compared with investment professionals assigned a firm valuation objective, those assigned a managerial performance evaluation objective assess accountin...
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作者：Chen, Hanwen; Tang, Song; Wu, Donghui; Yang, Daoguang
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Chinese University of Hong Kong; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：In China's political selection system, officials capable of growing local economies are rewarded with promotions. Eager to demonstrate economic achievements, newly appointed local leaders may raise tax revenues to expand fiscal expenditures on infrastructure projects. Against this backdrop, we study how political appointments influence local firms' tax planning. Based on a sample of locally administered state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we find that firms decrease their tax avoidance after new l...
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作者：Beyer, Anne; Dye, Ronald A.
作者单位：Stanford University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper studies equilibrium voluntary disclosures for a company financed with both debt and equity, where the firm's manager is compensated based on a linear combination of the market prices of the firm's equity and enterprise values (i.e., the sum of its values of equity and debt). Such compensation policies span all equity'' contracts, all debt'' contracts, and all enterprise value'' contracts. We show: (1) under both all equity'' and all debt'' contracts, increased debt always leads to r...
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作者：Call, Andrew C.; Donovan, John B.; Jennings, Jared
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Notre Dame; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We examine whether lenders use analyst forecasts of the borrower's earnings as inputs when establishing covenant thresholds in private debt contracts. We find that, among debt contracts that include an earnings covenant, earnings thresholds are set closer to analyst forecasts when analysts have historically issued more accurate earnings forecasts. These results are robust to firm fixed effects and an instrumental variable approach. Further, we find that, following a plausibly exogenous decline...
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作者：Huang, Sterling; Ng, Jeffrey; Ranasinghe, Tharindra; Zhang, Mingyue
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Hong Kong Polytechnic University; American University; University of Toronto
摘要：Successful innovations could induce more disclosure if the information asymmetry between the firm and its investors about post-innovation outcomes leads investors to demand more information. However, such innovations also likely entail greater proprietary cost concerns, which deter disclosure. This paper uses patent grants to examine the effect of innovation success on management guidance behavior. We find that more management guidance follows patent grants, suggesting that despite disclosure ...
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作者：Ge, Rui; Ji, Yuan; Louis, Henock
作者单位：Shenzhen University; Audencia; University of Texas System; University of Texas Arlington; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We show that the number of governance provisions imposed on a firm by a strategic alliance partner decreases with the firm's accounting quality. This effect is weaker when the firm has greater bargaining power and stronger when the alliance project is riskier. Moreover, the net benefit to an alliance partner of imposing an additional governance provision on its counterparty apparently increases when the counterparty accounting quality is low, resulting in an enhancement of the partner's market...
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作者：Yin, Huaxiang
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University
摘要：I investigate whether organizations can use the power of the employee'' to reduce managers' opportunistic behavior toward others. I predict that revealing this behavior to employees makes managers less inclined to act opportunistically. Employees' knowledge has a stronger impact on reducing managers' opportunistic behavior when managers have discretion over employee rewards versus when they do not. I further predict that the effect of employee-based control depends on whether managers are othe...
