-
作者：Baik, Dave (Young -Il); Chen, Clara Xiaoling; Godsell, David
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We investigate the effect of board gender diversity (BGD) on investment outcomes. We identify variation in BGD by compiling, for the first time, a global catalog of 83 BGD interventions implemented in 59 countries between 1999 and 2021. Using a staggered difference-in-differences research design, we document that BGD interventions improve investment outcomes. We find that treated firms reduce inefficient investment by 0.6 percent of total assets or 6.5 percent of total investment and are 4 per...
-
作者：Autrey, Romana L.; Drasgow, Fritz; Jackson, Kevin E.; Klevsky, Elena
作者单位：Willamette University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Tampa
摘要：Creativity drives profit in an idea economy, and many companies organize teams to facilitate creativity. This paper investigates the strategic deployment of individuals to boost a team's creativity. More individualistic team members tend to generate highly original ideas yet are less likely to share these ideas. We theorize that adding a connector-an individual strongly predisposed to form and foster relationships-to a team will enable more idea sharing among individualistic team members, thus...
-
作者：Dambra, Michael; Mihov, Atanas; Sanz, Leandro
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; SUNY Maritime College; University at Buffalo, SUNY; University of Kansas; University of Notre Dame
摘要：We study the real effects on innovation of a transformative change in corporate disclosure dissemination, the implementation of the SEC's EDGAR system. On the one hand, increased disclosure dissemination can lower firms' cost of capital, thereby stimulating innovative activity. On the other hand, increased dissemination can exacerbate proprietary disclosure costs, reducing firms' incentives to innovate. We show that treated firms reduce innovation investment following EDGAR's implementation. I...
-
作者：Kachelmeier, Steven J.; Webb, R. Alan; Williamson, Michael G.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Waterloo; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Toward the goal of reconciling conflicting arguments on whether performance -based incentives facilitate or impede divergent thinking, we identify a feature common to prior demonstrations of negative incentive effects: they generally involve tasks with only one correct solution. Our first experiment replicates a negative incentive effect when insight problems require bottom -up divergent thinking from an unexpected resource to the problem it is uniquely equipped to solve, whereas our second ex...
-
作者：Zhang, Gaoqing; Zheng, Ronghuo
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We study the role of reporting systems in the context of bank runs. In our model, a bank receives an early but imprecise estimate of its investment performance, and its financial reporting system generates a report. We find that, from a financial -stability standpoint, the optimal reporting system requires full disclosure when the bank's early estimate is below a certain threshold, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, such optimal reporting threshold should be tailored to the bank's expos...
-
作者：Pawliczek, Andrea; Skinner, A. Nicole; Zechman, Sarah L. C.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We examine how disclosure and manager reputation influence capital raised when there is no commercial substance underlying the investment. Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs or blank check companies) do not have operations or substantive assets at the IPO but promise to use the funds raised to acquire a private firm, generally within two years. Given the lack of commercial substance and historically poor ex post performance, it is unclear what SPACs disclose at the IPO and why invest...
-
作者：Lennox, Clive; Wu, Xi
作者单位：Central University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an important way for non-Big 4 accounting firms to grow their businesses. Non-Big 4 firms also account for the vast majority of PCAOB inspections. Consistent with negative inspection reports signaling low quality at inspected firms, we find that non-Big 4 accounting firms conduct fewer M&A deals after they receive negative inspection reports. Additional analyses support our hypothesized signaling mechanism: (1) the chilling effect of inspection reports on M&...
-
作者：Rimkus, Dan
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：Auditors collect evidence from clients that vary in social status. I investigate how these status differences interact with the costliness of auditor requests, thereby influencing client cooperation during evidence collection. I develop theory predicting that higher-status clients' cooperation decisions will be more sensitive to differences in the costliness of requests than lower-status clients' decisions. I test this theory across two experiments using multiple methods, leveraging the comple...
-
作者：Zhang, Vincent (Qiru)
作者单位：Santa Clara University
摘要：In 2010, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board proposed a rule change requiring the display of current credit ratings on the EMMA website, a centralized repository of municipal bond information. Before the rule change, current credit ratings were freely available on individual rating agencies' websites or on EMMA if municipalities provided relevant continuing disclosures, making it unclear whether the rule change would benefit investors. A difference-in-differences analysis reveals the rul...
-
作者：Bonham, Jonathan D.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：I study productive activity, measurement, and compensation in a principal agent model that relaxes common restrictions on the action set of the agent, the distribution of performance measures, and the shape of the wage schedule. The solution to this relaxed problem unifies insights from extant theory and shares features with well-known empirical phenomena. In particular, the optimal outcome distribution has a kink, optimal measurement is conservative, and optimal wages ensure congruent incenti...
