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作者：Chen, Wei; Hribar, Paul; Melessa, Samuel
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：We analyze a procedure common in empirical accounting and finance research where researchers use ordinary least squares to decompose a dependent variable into its predicted and residual components and use the residuals as the dependent variable in a second regression. This two-step procedure is used to examine determinants of constructs such as discretionary accruals, real activities management, discretionary book-tax differences, and abnormal investment. We show that the typical implementatio...
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作者：Bernard, Darren; Cade, Nicole L.; Hodge, Frank
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Using an experiment to rule out reverse causality, we examine whether a small investment in a company's stock leads investors to purchase more of the company's products and adopt other views and preferences that benefit the company. We preregister our research methods, hypotheses, and supplemental analyses via the Journal of Accounting Research's registration-based editorial process. We find little evidence consistent with these hypotheses for the average investor in our sample using our plann...
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作者：Antle, Rick; Bogetoft, Peter
作者单位：Yale University; Copenhagen Business School
摘要：We investigate optimal rationing of resources and organizational slack when a principal procures from an agent with private information about fixed and variable costs. We study the problem in a two-period setting with persistent types and investigate how the optimal rationing and slack depend on whether production increases or decreases over time. We find that rationing in a dynamic model with persistent types is extra costly, since the types that are eliminated in period 1 might have been att...
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作者：Zakolyukina, Anastasia A.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：This paper uses data on detected misstatementsearnings restatementsand a dynamic model to estimate the extent of undetected misstatements that violate GAAP. The model features a CEO who can manipulate his firm's stock price by misstating earnings. I find the CEO's expected cost of misleading investors is low. The probability of detection over a five-year horizon is 13.91%, and the average misstatement, if detected, results in an 8.53% loss in the CEO's retirement wealth. The low expected cost ...
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作者：Elliott, W. Brooke; Grant, Stephanie M.; Hodge, Frank D.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：We examine how CEOs can facilitate the development of investor trust that helps mitigate the effects of negative information. Results from an experiment show that investors trust the CEO more and are more willing to invest in the firm when the CEO communicates firm news followed by a negative earnings surprise through a personal Twitter account than when the news and surprise comes from the CEO via a website or from the firm's Investor Relations Twitter account or website. A follow-up experime...
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作者：Dou, Yiwei; Ryan, Stephen G.; Xie, Biqin
作者单位：New York University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We examine the real effects of FAS 166 and FAS 167 on banks' loan-level mortgage approval and sale decisions. Effective in 2010, these standards tightened the accounting for securitizations and consolidation of securitization entities, respectively, causing banks to recognize an estimated $811 billion of securitized assets on balance sheet. We find that banks that recognize more securitized assets exhibit larger decreases in mortgage approval rates and larger increases in mortgage sale rates. ...
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作者：Bushee, Brian J.; Gow, Ian D.; Taylor, Daniel J.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Melbourne
摘要：Prior research generally interprets complex language in firms' disclosures as indicative of managerial obfuscation. However, complex language can also reflect the provision of complex information; for example, informative technical disclosure. As a consequence, linguistic complexity commingles two latent componentsobfuscation and informationthat are related to information asymmetry in opposite directions. We develop a novel empirical approach to estimate these two latent components within the ...
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作者：Huang, Sterling; Hilary, Gilles
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Georgetown University
摘要：We show that board tenure exhibits an inverted U-shaped relation with firm value and accounting performance. The quality of corporate decisions, such as M&A, financial reporting quality, and CEO compensation, also has a quadratic relation with board tenure. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that directors' on-the-job learning improves firm value up to a threshold, at which point entrenchment dominates and firm performance suffers. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a samp...
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作者：Kowaleski, Zachary T.; Mayhew, Brian W.; Tegeler, Amy C.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
摘要：We use experimental markets to examine whether providing consulting services to a non-audit client impacts audit quality. Our paper directly addresses concerns raised by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board that the largest public accounting firms' growth in their consulting practices threatens audit quality. We conduct an experiment proposed using a registration-based editorial process. We compare a baseline where the auditor does not provide consulting services to conditions where a...
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作者：Einhorn, Eti; Langberg, Nisan; Versano, Tsahi
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intraindustry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate managers to alter stockholders' beliefs about the value of their firm not only by manipulating their own earnings report but also by influencing the earnings reports of rival firms. Managers obviously do not h...
