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作者:Arya, Anil; Ramanan, Ram N. V.
作者单位:University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Indian School of Business (ISB)
摘要:A CEO's short horizon and associated myopic actions are typically viewed as detrimental to the firm. In contrast, studying a voluntary disclosure model wherein capital market and product market strategic considerations are in play, we show that the CEO's myopic behavior can improve a firm's long-term value. In particular, the disclosures of a longhorizon CEO are seen as being entirely focused on the firm's interests and thus as being exploitative of customers. A short -horizon CEO myopically f...
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作者:Donelson, Dain C.; Kubic, Matthew; Toynbee, Sara
作者单位:University of Iowa; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要:We examine whether performance reporting leads to inconsistent enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In a sample of over 13,000 SEC enforcement actions, we show that SEC staff respond to performance -reporting pressures and file more enforcement actions in September, the final month of the SEC's fiscal year, than in any other month. The increase in case volume in September is not fully explained by staff filing more procedural cases or accelerating case filings. Instead,...
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作者:Barth, Mary E.; Gee, Kurt H.
作者单位:Stanford University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要:Glaeser and Lang (2024; GL) reviews the accounting literature on innovation, which has increased substantially in recent years. GL makes an important contribution to accounting research by bringing into the literature the implications of Romer's Nobel Prize winning endogenous growth theory and by explaining how accounting research addresses questions related to innovation. We contribute to accounting research by building on GL's foundation to suggest three main paths forward for future innovat...
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作者:Beyer, Anne; Jeong, Junyoung
作者单位:Stanford University
摘要:We discuss Feng et al. (2024), which studies a dynamic model of delegated investment. The paper provides novel insights into the optimal contract between a principal and an agent who obtains private information about both the timing and profitability of investment opportunities. While the analytical analysis provides interesting findings, we have concerns about the validity of the paper's empirical predictions. We extend the conceptualand operationallevels of Libby boxes by adding an analytica...
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作者:Nan, Lin; Tang, Chao; Zhang, Gaoqing
作者单位:Purdue University System; Purdue University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要:We examine the impact of increasing whistleblowing bounties on whistleblowers' strategy and regulatory efficiency in detecting fraud. Our analysis shows the regulator extracts information about the incidence of fraud from whistleblowers' actions, and the quality of such information depends on the size of whistleblowing bounties. With a larger bounty, upon receiving a whistleblowing report, the quality of the regulator's information about fraud deteriorates, whereas upon observing no whistleblo...
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作者:Ellahie, Atif
作者单位:Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要:A signal that identifies asset pricing bubbles would be valuable so investors could reposition their portfolios to weather the bubble, yet ex ante bubble identification has proven illusory. Arif and Sul (2024) study whether industry-level investment in net operating asset (NOA) accruals is an ex ante accounting-based signal that predicts bubbles. Using industry-level price run-ups across 49 countries, they find that NOA accruals predict a higher likelihood of a future crash, lower future retur...
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作者:Tseng, Kevin; Zhong, Rong (Irene)
作者单位:Chinese University of Hong Kong; National Taiwan University; National Taiwan University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要:This study examines whether and how financial statement comparability facilitates the dissemination of innovative knowledge between firms and stimulates the creation of new knowledge. Using cross-patent citations to track interfirm knowledge transfers, we find that comparability increases firms' incentives to learn from peers and create new patents that cite their peers' existing patents. The investigation into the mechanism reveals that comparability improves firms' ability to estimate the mo...
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作者:Hao, Jinji
作者单位:Victoria University Wellington
摘要:This paper shows that mandating some firms to disclose more while leaving other firms disclosing voluntarily is less effective in improving and may even harm the overall information environment when firms' disclosures are endogenous. Although the regulated firms' increased disclosure directly reduces all firms' cost of capital, it crowds out the unregulated firms' voluntary disclosure and thus increases all firms' cost of capital indirectly. Under certain circumstances, the negative indirect e...
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作者:Liang, Chuchu
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要:Advertising is a critical competitive tool that shapes interactions among firms in the product market. Using third-party tracked data on advertising outlet costs, I find that a nontrivial portion of public firms, even those with intense advertising activities, do not disclose advertising expenses in their financial statements, indicating significant disclosure discretion. I further use product category-level advertising data to develop a firm-specific measure of advertising rivalry. I predict ...
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作者:Colonnello, Stefano; Koetter, Michael; Wagner, Konstantin
作者单位:Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Leibniz Association; Leibniz Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH); Otto von Guericke University
摘要:The regulation that caps executives' variable compensation, as part of the Capital Re-quirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do no...