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作者：Call, Andrew C.; Hribar, Paul; Skinner, Douglas J.; Volant, David
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Iowa; University of Chicago; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：We survey corporate managers of both guiding and non-guiding firms. We find that managers of firms that provide guidance say that they: (1) primarily provide guidance to satisfy analyst and investor demands and manage analysts' earnings expectations; (2) are relatively unconcerned about proprietary or litigation costs (managers of non-guiding firms are more likely to see litigation risk as a concern); (3) predominantly issue guidance that is conservative relative to their internal expectations...
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作者：Minnis, Michael; Sutherland, Andrew G.; Vetter, Felix W.
作者单位：University of Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Mannheim
摘要：Using a dataset covering 3 million commercial borrower financial statements, we document a substantial, nearly monotonic decline in banks' use of attested financial statements (AFS) in lending over the past two decades. Two market forces help explain this trend. First, technological advances provide lenders with access to a growing array of borrower information sources that can substitute for AFS. Second, banks are increasingly competing with nonbank lenders that rely less on AFS in screening ...
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作者：Choy, Stacey; Jiang, Shushu; Liao, Scott; Wang, Emma
作者单位：University of Toronto; National University of Singapore; Cornell University
摘要：This paper examines whether and how public environmental enforcement affects private lenders' monitoring efforts and the effectiveness of such monitoring. We capture lender monitoring using environmental covenants in loan agreements. Consistent with the prediction that stringent public environmental enforcement increases lenders' monitoring incentives, we find that in the presence of higher environmental regulatory enforcement intensity, lenders are more likely to use environmental covenants w...
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作者：Fiechter, Peter; Landsman, Wayne R.; Peasnell, Kenneth; Renders, Annelies
作者单位：University of Neuchatel; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; Lancaster University; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：This study examines whether the implementation of industry-specific accounting standards helps capital market participants in making decisions about providing capital to firms. We predict and find an, on average, increase in firms' capital growth in years following implementation of the relevant industry standard. The increase in capital growth arises primarily from equity issuances and is attributable to the implementation of the standards rather than industry-specific trends or economic shoc...
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作者：Kitto, Andrew R.
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：This study examines whether recent mergers between small and midsize accounting firms influence competition by increasing the number of firms that can compete with larger rivals in the U.S. public company audit market. I find that in-market mergers generate efficiencies that are reflected in a post-merger reduction in audit hours but not in reduced audit quality. For both in-market and out-of-market mergers, clients switching to postmerger firms are more likely to be accelerated filers and are...
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作者：Abramova, Inna
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：Using labor supply shocks from the 150-Hour Rule, I find that a reduction in the labor supply of accountants increases audit firms' mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and the audit market concentration. These M&A deals connect audit firms serving clients in the same states and lead to greater industry specialization of the merging firms. Although both small and large auditors generally engage in labor supply-driven M&A deals, large audit firms' engagement in M&A is restricted to markets with a tig...
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作者：Kang, Jung Koo
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：I explore whether big-data sources can crowd out the value of private information acquired through lending relationships. Institutional lenders have been shown to exploit their access to borrowers' private information by trading on it in financial markets. As a shock to this advantage, I use the release of the satellite data of car counts in store parking lots of U.S. retailers. This data provides accurate and near-real-time signals of firm performance, which can undermine the value of borrowe...
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作者：Sloan, Richard G.
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：Li, Watts, and Zhu (2024) provide evidence that retail investors trade in response to financially material ESG news. This evidence is consistent with retail investors trading in response to the financial implications of ESG-related information in much the same way that they trade in response to the financial implications of other information. The authors suggest that their evidence is inconsistent with retail investors making investment decisions based on their nonpecuniary preferences. I sugg...
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作者：Vanhaverbeke, Steven; Balsmeier, Benjamin; Doherr, Thorsten
作者单位：KU Leuven; University of Luxembourg; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：When firms are forced to publicly disclose financial information, credit rating agencies are generally expected to improve their risk assessments. Theory predicts such an information quality effect but also suggests an adverse reputational concerns effect since credit analysts may become increasingly concerned about alleged rating failures. We empirically examine these predictions using a large-scale quasi-natural experiment in Germany, where a new compliance regime required firms to disclose ...
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作者：Laux, Christian; Laux, Volker
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We study the interaction between optimal financial reporting rules and managers' incentives to gather additional information about firm performance. Accounting -based covenants transfer control rights to lenders, allowing them to take corrective actions. After the accounting report is released, the manager can exert effort to uncover whether the report is a false alarm or unduly optimistic. The manager's incentive to gather information stems from optimal incentive contracts and private benefit...
