-
作者：Lawrence, Alastair; Ryans, James; Sun, Estelle; Laptev, Nikolay
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Boston University; Facebook Inc
摘要：This study presents a field experiment in which media articles for a random sample of firms with earnings announcements are promoted to a one percent subset of Yahoo Finance users. Promoted firms have higher abnormal returns and some evidence of lower bid-ask spreads on the day of the earnings announcement. These results are more pronounced for less visible firms, negative earnings news, and on days with fewer promoted firms. These findings suggest that investor attention affects the pricing o...
-
作者：Bettis, J. Carr; Bizjak, John; Coles, Jeffrey L.; Kalpathy, Swaminathan
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Texas Christian University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Texas Christian University
摘要：The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards reported in company disclosures versus economic value. We also find that equity-based grants continue to convey significant compensation convexity (vega) after ASC 718 (2005) and that, counter to recent...
-
作者：Dye, Ronald A.; Hughes, John S.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We study a firm's manager's voluntary disclosure decisions and those disclosure decisions' asset pricing, cost of capital, and information transfer effects in a model where investors trade multiple securities. We: develop new asset pricing formulas when the manager makes no disclosure that impose testable cross-equation restrictions on firms' market values; develop a wide array of comparative statics; obtain surprising findings about nondisclosure's effects on investors' perceptions of uncerta...
-
作者：Erel, Isil
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Financing Acquisitions with Eamouts by Thomas Bates, Jordan Neyland, and Yolanda Wang broadly focuses on an important topic: how firms finance their acquisitions. Specifically, authors study the role of earnout agreements in financing acquisitions and show that they could be substantial both for financially constrained firms and at times when external capital is more expensive. My discussion focuses on the economic significance of the results presented, questioning the importance of earnouts i...
-
作者：Kim, Jaewoo
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：Using the collapse of the junk bond market in the early 1990s as an exogenous shock to external capital, I document, in both difference-in-differences and triple difference designs, that speculative-grade firms that recognize economic losses in a timely manner experience a smaller reduction in investment following the collapse. The effect is more pronounced for speculative-grade firms with a low level of asset liquidation value. Using the excess bond premium as a proxy for fluctuations in the ...
-
作者：Nikolaev, Valeri V.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：I study whether the demand for monitoring explains the scope for renegotiation in private debt contracts. Theory suggests that renegotiation trades off the benefits of enhanced monitoring with the costs of creditor intervention. Consistent with this tradeoff, I show that monitoring demand proxies bear a positive association with renegotiation intensity. In contrast, the costs of creditor intervention are associated with less frequent renegotiations. I also find that contractual monitoring mech...
-
作者：Souther, Matthew E.
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
摘要：Recent literature emphasizes the importance of a director's external network of social connections. I use a sample of closed-end funds to show that internal, within-board connections are also significant determinants of shareholder value. I find that boards with shared education, employment, and family backgrounds exhibit lower market values, higher expense ratios, higher director compensation levels, and an increased likelihood of financial misrepresentation. Director turnover is lower within...
-
作者：Thong, Rong (Irene)
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：Firm innovation drives both firm competitiveness and economic growth. Constructing a novel firm-patent panel database from 29 countries, I find that transparency directly boosts innovative effort by reducing managerial career concerns. This effect operates through transparency's implicit contracting role: it reduces the sensitivity of management turnover to poor innovative output. Transparency also increases innovative efficiency through its governance role in facilitating efficient allocation...
-
作者：Erkens, Michael H. R.; Gan, Ying; Yurtoglu, B. Burcin
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
摘要：We develop a Clawback Strength Index and show that while some firms adopt unambiguous and strong clawback provisions, others adopt weak ones. We find that strong clawback adopters experience improvements in financial reporting quality, fewer CEO turnovers, and lower CEO pay. We advance two possible explanations: First, clawback strength may be primarily responsible for the improvements in reporting quality. Second, strong clawbacks may yield benefits because they are part of a broader reform p...
-
作者：Gow, Ian D.; Wahid, Aida Sijamic; Yu, Gwen
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Toronto; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We examine how directors' reputations are managed through disclosure choices. We focus on disclosures in the director biographies filed with the SEC. We find that a directorship on another board is more likely to be undisclosed when the other firm experienced an adverse event-such as an accounting restatement, securities litigation, or bankruptcy-during the director's tenure. Withholding such information is associated with a more favorable stock price reaction to the director's appointment and...
