Managing reputation: Evidence from biographies of corporate directors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gow, Ian D.; Wahid, Aida Sijamic; Yu, Gwen
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne; University of Toronto; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.08.009
• 发表日期: 2018
• 关键词: disclosure; MARKET; RESTATEMENTS; INFORMATION; CONSEQUENCES; incentives; OWNERSHIP; IMPACT; boards

摘要

We examine how directors' reputations are managed through disclosure choices. We focus on disclosures in the director biographies filed with the SEC. We find that a directorship on another board is more likely to be undisclosed when the other firm experienced an adverse event-such as an accounting restatement, securities litigation, or bankruptcy-during the director's tenure. Withholding such information is associated with a more favorable stock price reaction to the director's appointment and the loss of fewer subsequent directorships. These findings suggest that reputation concerns lead to strategic disclosure choices that have real consequences in capital and labor markets.