-
作者：He, Jiapeng; Li, Ningzhong
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This study examines the role of the accounting quality of U.S. federal agencies, measured with audit opinions, in federal budget allocations to those agencies. We find that, when an agency receives a modified audit opinion, the president proposes and Congress enacts a lower budget for the agency, and the budgetary disagreement between them increases. These effects strengthen when the president and Congress have stronger incentives to demonstrate spending accountability to taxpayers. Exploiting...
-
作者：Azinovic-Yang, Li; Baldenius, Tim
作者单位：University of Chicago; Columbia University
摘要：How does information asymmetry within firms affect their innovation incentives? To address this question, we introduce an agency problem with strategic reporting into an experimentation setting. Severe agency problems disrupt truthful reporting, and thereby also experimentation. However, for moderate agency problems, the firm may experiment more than in a symmetric information setting, because experimenting improves the agent's reporting incentives. Unlike traditional real-options models, expe...
-
作者：Cowx, Mary
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Tax enforcement deters noncompliance, increasing tax revenue, but may also discourage taxpayer investment in activities that policymakers aim to incentivize through tax credits and deductions. This paper investigates this investment-revenue trade-off through the lens of the research and development (R&D) tax credit, a federal tax incentive that is highly scrutinized by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). My results suggest that expectations about IRS corporate tax scrutiny are negatively assoc...
-
作者：Blankespoor, Elizabeth; deHaan, Ed; Guay, Wayne; Lang, Mark; Shroff, Nemit; Wu, Joanna
-
作者：Chen, Chuan; Jia, Yanrong; Martin, Xiumin; Silveira, Bernardo
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Washington University (WUSTL); University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We examine the objective function of the SEC against financial misconduct by estimating a structural model of the interactions between the SEC and a regulated firm. The SEC considers social costs, enforcement costs, and firms' compliance costs when making enforcement decisions. Identification exploits SOX as a shock to enforcement intensity. Four insights emerge from counterfactual analyses. First, marginal social costs have a greater impact on the SEC's perceived welfare than marginal enforce...
-
作者：Liu, Betty; Moss, Austin
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We offer empirical evidence on the role of accounting information in shaping the incentives to produce fake news. We document that fake news authors strategically (1) publish their articles near earnings announcements, leveraging the widespread market attention these events attract, and (2) within the near-announcement window, avoid publishing post-announcement when investors are less susceptible to fake news due to the disclosure of accounting information. In extending our analyses to the bro...
-
作者：Ru, Hong; Yang, Endong; Zou, Kunru
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; University of Macau; University of Macau; Hong Kong Baptist University
摘要：This study investigates how CEOs' experience of natural disasters and severe disease outbreaks in their formative years influences their firms' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. We observe that firms whose CEOs experienced disease outbreaks akin to COVID-19 early in their lives demonstrated more conservative responses to the emergence of the COVID-19 in late February 2020, notably through a substantial slowdown in capital expenditure growth. Moreover, firms led by CEOs w...
-
作者：Christensen, Derek; Mittendorf, Brian; Partridge, Clay
作者单位：University of Oregon; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：A growing literature suggests that accounting standards not only affect public information but also improve the information environment within a firm, leading to operational changes. In this paper, we examine one mechanism for the informational improvements brought by accounting standards. We present a model that demonstrates myopic incentives driven by short-term price pressure can endogenously lead to underinvestment in information. However, imposing an accounting standard that mandates a mi...
-
作者：Kim, Jinhwan; Valentine, Kristen
作者单位：Stanford University; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Innovative public firms sell significantly more patents in the last month of their fiscal year compared to earlier in the year. Consistent with reporting incentives driving these sales, final month patent sales are disproportionately internally generated, non-core patents with high potential accounting gains. Strategic patent sales are more pronounced among firms with incentives to meet earnings expectations-especially in periods when firms narrowly beat expectations and when executive incenti...
-
作者：Weber, David P.; Xu, Nina; Zhang, Kangkang
作者单位：University of Connecticut; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We examine whether heightened SEC scrutiny of financial reporting affects corporate risk-taking. Because managers are risk-averse, tightened regulatory oversight could increase risk-taking by strengthening accounting's governance role, or reduce it by constraining managers' ability to shield themselves from risky outcomes through earnings management. In 2007, the SEC elevated six district offices to the regional level, expanding their authority and enforcement resources. Using this reorganizat...
