An examination of direct and spillover effects of accounting standards on firms' information environments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Christensen, Derek; Mittendorf, Brian; Partridge, Clay
• 署名单位: University of Oregon; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101; 1879-1980
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101900
• 发表日期: 2026-11
• 页码: 101900
• 关键词: earnings management; BONUS SCHEMES; managerial; incentives; reserves

摘要

A growing literature suggests that accounting standards not only affect public information but also improve the information environment within a firm, leading to operational changes. In this paper, we examine one mechanism for the informational improvements brought by accounting standards. We present a model that demonstrates myopic incentives driven by short-term price pressure can endogenously lead to underinvestment in information. However, imposing an accounting standard that mandates a minimum level of information quality increases acquisition of decision-relevant information for activities the standard targets and untargeted but related activities. The resulting improvements in reporting quality accentuate investors' reliance on the accounting report, which incentivizes the manager to put forth more effort. Collectively, the improvements in information quality and increase in effort improve the firm's subsequent profitability. Using archival data in the context of the revenue recognition standard (ASC 606), we find evidence consistent with the primary conclusions of the modeled environment.