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作者：Gao, Feng
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University Newark
摘要：This paper documents how firms exercise discretion in defining affiliates and reporting public float in response to Securities and Exchange Commission regulations. I find that firms with higher expected compliance costs under section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tend to classify more shares as affiliated and report lower public float. In contrast, firms issuing seasoned equity are less likely to underreport public float, possibly due to favorable regulatory treatment for large issuers...
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作者：Louis, Henock; Sun, Amy X.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：We examine acquiring managers' opportunistic reporting behavior around stock-for-stock acquisitions. Using the timing of merger announcements and completions to infer managerial intent, we show that acquirers with the most inflated earnings tend to announce mergers on Fridays, and that they manage earnings several quarters before the merger announcement date. Friday announcers exhibit a stronger negative association between pre-merger announcement abnormal accruals and post-merger announcement...
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作者：Gao, Xinghua; Jia, Yonghong
作者单位：Governors State University
摘要：We test whether internal control weaknesses (ICWs) endanger cash resources that manifests in a lower value of cash. Our results indicate that investors value liquid assets in ICW firms substantially less than they do in non-ICW firms. The negative valuation effect of weak internal control mainly concentrates on ICWs related to the control environment or overall financial reporting process. While firms remediating ICWs reverse the value loss from holding cash, firms whose internal control deter...
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作者：Johnstone, David
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：It is widely held that better financial reporting makes investors more confident in their predictions of future cash flows and reduces their required risk premia. The logic is that more information leads necessarily to more certainty, and hence lower subjective estimates of firm beta or covariance with other firms. This is misleading on both counts. Bayesian logic shows that the best available information can often leave decision makers less certain about future events. And for those cases whe...
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作者：Kachelmeier, Steven J.; Thornock, Todd A.; Williamson, Michael G.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Iowa State University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We find that the effectiveness of piece-rate compensation relative to fixed pay in a laboratory letter-search task hinges on the presence or absence of a nonbinding statement to participants that the experimenter values correct responses. In the absence of the value statement, participants with piece-rate rewards for correct responses generate more correct and incorrect responses than do their counterparts with fixed pay, correcting errors as they go along to maximize compensation. Essentially...
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作者：Sedatole, Karen L.; Swaney, Amy M.; Woods, Alexander
作者单位：Michigan State University; Central Michigan University; William & Mary
摘要：This study examines the implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence for individuals working in teams but facing explicit incentives based solely on measures of individual performance. We combine proprietary performance data with survey data for 133 internal auditors. We show that the social influences of relatively high levels of both horizontal monitoring and team member dependence provide implicit incentives that motivate individual performance, making the ...
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作者：Becker, Sebastian D.; Mahlendorf, Matthias D.; Schaffer, Utz; Thaten, Mario
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
摘要：This article examines how corporate reliance on budgets is affected by major changes in the economic environment. We combine survey and archival data from the economic crisis that began in 2008. The results indicate that budgeting became more important for planning and resource allocation but less important for performance evaluation in companies affected more strongly by the 2008 economic crisis. Additional evidence from interviews and data gathered in a focus group further illustrate these r...
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作者：Bauer, Andrew M.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：I examine whether corporate tax avoidance is associated with internal control weaknesses (ICWs) disclosed under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). ICWs disclosed under SOX are frequently related to a firm's tax function. When pervasive ICWs exist, the likelihood increases that these frequent tax-related ICWs spill over from financial reporting issues to tax avoidance objectives. Thus, my research helps corporate stakeholders understand the implications of internal controls beyond simply financial r...
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作者：Kim, Chansog (Francis); Zhang, Liandong
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：This study investigates the relation between corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness. We study a broad array of corporate political activities, including the employment of connected directors, campaign contributions, and lobbying. Using a large hand-collected data set of U.S. firms' political connections, we find that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than nonconnected firms, after controlling for other determinants of tax aggressiveness, industry and year fixe...
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作者：Demirkan, Sebahattin; Zhou, Nan
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Morgan State University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Binghamton University, SUNY
摘要：We study the pricing of audit services for strategic alliances, a governance structure involving an incomplete contract between separate firms. Since incomplete contracts do not specify all future contingencies, we expect that the nonverifiability of information and potential agency behavior in alliances increase audit complexity, resulting in higher audit fees. Our findings support this prediction. We then separate strategic alliances into joint ventures and contractual alliances, as the latt...
