Communicated Values as Informal Controls: Promoting Quality While Undermining Productivity?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kachelmeier, Steven J.; Thornock, Todd A.; Williamson, Michael G.
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Iowa State University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12147
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1411-1434
• 关键词: performance; incentives; job; CONTRACTS; hype

摘要

We find that the effectiveness of piece-rate compensation relative to fixed pay in a laboratory letter-search task hinges on the presence or absence of a nonbinding statement to participants that the experimenter values correct responses. In the absence of the value statement, participants with piece-rate rewards for correct responses generate more correct and incorrect responses than do their counterparts with fixed pay, correcting errors as they go along to maximize compensation. Essentially, piece-rate compensation acts as an output control, incentivizing participants to maximize correct responses through a produce-and-improve strategy. The value statement suppresses this strategy because participants appear to perceive it as an input constraint, prompting greater initial care at the expense of lower overall productivity. As a result, the value statement eliminates the gains in correct responses that piece-rate incentivized participants otherwise realize. Thus, in settings in which individuals can gain efficiency by working expeditiously and improving quality when necessary, our results suggest the possibility that organizations could be better off just letting incentive schemes operate, rather than emphasizing quality in ways that could overly constrain productivity.