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作者：Barron, Orie E.; Byard, Donal; Yu, Yong
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This study examines how financial disclosures with earnings announcements affect sell-side analysts' information about future earnings, focusing on disclosures of financial statements and management earnings forecasts. We find that disclosures of balance sheets and segment data are associated with an increase in the degree to which analysts' forecasts of upcoming quarterly earnings are based on private information. Further analyses show that balance sheet disclosures are associated with an inc...
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作者：Nichols, D. Craig; Wahlen, James M.; Wieland, Matthew M.
作者单位：Syracuse University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University System of Ohio; Miami University
摘要：This study examines the extent to which parsimonious and general cross-sectional valuation models, restricted to include only publicly available historical accounting information, explain share prices in the cross section, identify periods when market mispricing may be more pervasive, and also identify which shares within those cross sections are more likely to be mispriced. Our model simply includes historical book value, earnings, dividends, and growth, but it explains on average over 60 per...
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作者：Seidel, Timothy A.
作者单位：Brigham Young University
摘要：Auditing standards prescribe a risk-based approach where auditors assess the risk of material misstatement and then design and perform audit procedures to reduce audit risk to an appropriately low level. Prior research suggests that auditors are responsive to high control-risk assessment (CRA), but that this response is, perhaps, only partially effective at reducing audit risk, with relatively little insight into where and why this occurs. By refining analyses to more detailed levels of the au...
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作者：Perreault, Stephen; Kida, Thomas; Piercey, M. David
作者单位：Providence College; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：Since most audit engagements identify multiple proposed audit adjustments, auditors must decide how best to present and negotiate these adjustments with their clients. Prior research indicates that auditors can negotiate adjustments individually (a sequential strategy) or can negotiate multiple adjustments within the same negotiation setting (a simultaneous strategy). This paper examines the relative effectiveness of a simultaneous versus sequential negotiation strategy in eliciting concession...
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作者：Guo, Lan; Libby, Theresa; Liu, Xiaotao (Kelvin)
作者单位：Wilfrid Laurier University; University of Waterloo; Northeastern University
摘要：Vertical pay dispersion is the difference in pay across different hierarchical levels within an organization (Milkovich and Newman 1996). While vertical pay dispersion may be useful in attracting, retaining, and motivating highly skilled employees (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Lazear 1995; Prendergast 1999), our study investigates a potential disadvantage; specifically, the negative impact of perceived unfairness of vertical pay dispersion on employees' budgeting decisions. We predict and find that ...
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作者：Anderson, Shannon W.; Chang, Hwei Fern; Cheng, Mandy M.; Phua, Yee Shih
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：Trust is often posited to substitute for management control in interfirm transactions. However, this raises questions of how trust arises in new relationships, and whether trust that is not based on prior experience transacting together is sufficient to persuade managers to forgo investments in management controls. We use an experiment to test whether two features of the early stage of an interfirm relationship influence a buyer's initial trust in a supplier and have consequences for subsequen...
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作者：Dierker, Martin; Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We explore the optimal timing of voluntary disclosures when firms and outside investors have correlated but not identical signals. By delaying disclosure of their signal, firms encourage the acquisition of information by investors by reducing the latter's exposure to the long-term risk of holding the asset. Immediate disclosure reduces rents from acquiring the correlated signal, and thus is sometimes suboptimal in a dynamic setting. We characterize conditions under which postponing disclosure ...
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作者：Fan, Yun; Liu, Xiaotao (Kelvin)
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston; Northeastern University
摘要：Prior studies of classification shifting in the income statement conclude that managers misclassify core expenses as special items to inflate reported core earnings (McVay 2006; Fan, Barua, Cready, and Thomas 2010). These studies do not distinguish between the core expense components-cost of goods sold (COGS) and selling, general, and administrative expenses (SGA). This study models COGS and SGA separately, and investigates managers' misclassification of COGS versus SGA to meet different profi...
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作者：Fang, Junxiong; Pittman, Jeffrey; Zhang, Yinqi; Zhao, Yuping
作者单位：Fudan University; Memorial University Newfoundland; American University; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：We examine which of two opposing financial reporting incentives that group-affiliated firms experience shapes their accounting transparency evident in auditor choice. In one direction, complex group structure and intragroup transactions enable controlling shareholders to pursue diversionary activities that they later hide by distorting reported earnings. In the other direction, as outside investors price-protect against potential expropriation, controlling shareholders may be eager to improve ...
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作者：Chen, Clara Xiaoling; Nichol, Jennifer E.; Zhou, Flora H.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Northeastern University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：Firms are under increasing pressure to implement effective internal whistleblowing systems. While firms can provide incentives to encourage internal whistleblowing, it remains controversial how such incentives should be structured. We examine whether the effectiveness of incentives encouraging internal whistleblowing is a joint function of the framing of such incentives (reward or penalty) and the strength of descriptive norms supporting internal whistleblowing. We predict and find in a lab ex...
