Dynamic Information Disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dierker, Martin; Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar
• 署名单位: Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12225
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 601-621
• 关键词: private information; MARKET-EFFICIENCY; public disclosure; financial reports; FIRMS; acquisition; liquidity; decisions; price; announcements

摘要

We explore the optimal timing of voluntary disclosures when firms and outside investors have correlated but not identical signals. By delaying disclosure of their signal, firms encourage the acquisition of information by investors by reducing the latter's exposure to the long-term risk of holding the asset. Immediate disclosure reduces rents from acquiring the correlated signal, and thus is sometimes suboptimal in a dynamic setting. We characterize conditions under which postponing disclosure is preferable, which allows us to develop predictions on the timing of voluntary information disclosures such as management guidance.