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作者：Hu, Shanshan; Hu, Xing; Ye, Qing
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Oregon; Tsinghua University
摘要：Instant discounts and mail-in rebates are two common pricing tools In retail, but they are not simple substitutes. On the one hand, consumers discount the face value of a mail-in rebate, making it less effective than an instant discount in inducing consumers' purchase. On the other hand, a portion of consumers with mail-in rebates fail to redeem them, resulting in savings for the retailer. We study how retailers, under pressure to move inventory, should use these two pricing tools to maximize ...
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作者：Smith, James E.; Ulu, Canan
作者单位：Duke University; Georgetown University
摘要：We use a dynamic programming model to study the impacts of risk aversion on information acquisition in technology adoption decisions. In this model, the benefit of the technology is uncertain and, in each period, the decision maker (DM) may adopt the technology, reject the technology, or pay to acquire a signal about the benefit of the technology. The dynamic programming state variables are the DM's wealth and a probability distribution that describes the DM's beliefs about the benefit of the ...
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作者：Negahban, Sahand; Oh, Sewoong; Shah, Devavrat
作者单位：Yale University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The question of aggregating pairwise comparisons to obtain a global ranking over a collection of objects has been of interest for a very long time: be it ranking of online gamers (e.g., MSR's TrueSkill system) and chess players, aggregating social opinions, or deciding which product to sell based on transactions. In most settings, in addition to obtaining a ranking, finding 'scores' for each object (e.g., player's rating) is of interest for understanding the intensity of the preferences. In th...
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作者：Dong, Hui; Nakayama, Marvin K.
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University Newark; New Jersey Institute of Technology
摘要：Quantiles are often used to measure risk of stochastic systems. We examine quantile estimators obtained using simulation with Latin hypercube sampling (LHS), a variance-reduction technique that efficiently extends stratified sampling to higher dimensions and produces negatively correlated outputs. We consider single-sample LHS (ssLHS), which minimizes the variance that can be obtained from LHS, and also replicated LHS (rLHS). We develop a consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance of the ...
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作者：Alpern, Steve
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：This paper introduces a new search paradigm to hide-and-seek games on networks. The Hider locates at any point on any arc. The Searcher adopts a combinatorial path when searching the network: a sequence of arcs, each adjacent to the last, and traced out at unit speed. In previous literature the Searcher was allowed simple motion, any unit speed path, including ones that turn around inside an arc. The new approach more closely models real problems such as search for improvised explosive devices...
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作者：Khazaei, Javad; Zakeri, Golbon; Oren, Shmuel S.
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Auckland; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Participants in electricity markets face a substantial amount of uncertainty, and with Increased penetration of volatile renewable generation this uncertainty has further increased. Conventionally designed electricity markets cope with uncertainty by running two markets: a market that is cleared ahead of time, followed by a real-time balancing market to reconcile actual realizations of demand and available generation. In such mechanisms, the initial clearing process does not take into account ...
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作者：Wang, Tong; Gong, Xiting; Zhou, Sean X.
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We study optimal policies for dual-supply inventory systems where a firm commits to buying a total minimum quantity from both supplies or two separate total minimum quantities from each supply over a finite planning horizon. The two supply options differ in their costs and lead times. For the system under the joint commitment, the optimal policy has a simple structure and can be fully characterized by three critical numbers in each period. For the system under the separate commitments, we show...
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作者：Asadpour, Arash; Goemans, Michel X.; Madry, Aleksander; Gharan, Shayan Oveis; Saberi, Amin
作者单位：New York University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Stanford University
摘要：We present a randomized O(log n /log log n)-approximation algorithm for the asymmetric traveling salesman problem (ATSP). This provides the first asymptotic improvement over the long-standing Theta(log n)-approximation bound stemming from the work of Frieze et al. (1982) [ Frieze AM, Galbiati G, Maffioki F (1982) On the worst-case performance of some algorithms for the asymmetric traveling salesman problem. Networks 12(1): 23-39]. The key ingredient of our approach is a new connection between ...
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作者：Hong, L. Jeff; Juneja, Sandeep; Liu, Guangwu
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; City University of Hong Kong; Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR)
摘要：Nested estimation involves estimating an expectation of a function of a conditional expectation via simulation. This problem has of late received increasing attention amongst researchers due to its broad applicability particularly in portfolio risk measurement and in pricing complex derivatives. In this paper, we study a kernel smoothing approach. We analyze its asymptotic properties, and present efficient algorithms for practical implementation. While asymptotic results suggest that the kerne...
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作者：Ruddell, K.; Philpott, A. B.; Downward, A.
作者单位：University of Auckland
摘要：Supply function equilibrium models are used to study electricity market auctions with uncertain demand. We study the effects on the supply function equilibrium of a tax, levied by the system operator, on the observed surplus of producers. Such a tax provides an incentive for producers to alter their offers to avoid the tax. We consider these incentives under both strategic and price-taking assumptions. The model is extended to a setting in which producers are taxed on the benefits accruing to ...
