Supply Function Equilibrium with Taxed Benefits

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ruddell, K.; Philpott, A. B.; Downward, A.
• 署名单位: University of Auckland
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.2016.1555
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1-18
• 关键词: electricity spot market; COMPETITION; uncertainty

摘要

Supply function equilibrium models are used to study electricity market auctions with uncertain demand. We study the effects on the supply function equilibrium of a tax, levied by the system operator, on the observed surplus of producers. Such a tax provides an incentive for producers to alter their offers to avoid the tax. We consider these incentives under both strategic and price-taking assumptions. The model is extended to a setting in which producers are taxed on the benefits accruing to them from a transmission line expansion (a beneficiaries-pay transmission charge). In this setting, we show how this tax may lead to lower prices in equilibrium.