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作者：Andersen, Kim Allan; Boomsma, Trine Krogh; Efkes, Britta; Forget, Nicolas
作者单位：Aarhus University; University of Copenhagen; University of Wuppertal; Johannes Kepler University Linz
摘要：This paper considers sensitivity analysis of the cost coefficients in multiobjective integer linear programming problems. We define the sensitivity region as the set of simultaneous changes to the coefficients for which the efficient set and its structure remain the same. In particular, we require that the component -wise relation between efficient solutions is preserved and that inefficient solutions remain inefficient, and we show that this is sufficient for the efficient set to be the same ...
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作者：Tian, Xuan; Tu, Guoqian; Wang, Yichu
作者单位：Tsinghua University; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; University of Nottingham Ningbo China
摘要：We provide firm-level evidence on the real effects of shadow banking in terms of technological innovation. Firm-to-firm entrusted loans, the largest part of the shadow banking sector in China, enhance the borrowers' innovation output. The effects are more prominent when the borrowers are subject to severer financial constraints, information asymmetry, and takeover exposures. A plausible underlying channel is capital reallocations from less productive but easily financed lender firms to more in...
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作者：Fang, Bingxu; Saiy, Sasan; Vyas, Dushyantkumar
作者单位：Singapore Management University; University of Waterloo; University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga; University of Toronto
摘要：Valuation plays a central role in determining Chapter 11 reorganization outcomes. However, obtaining accurate valuation estimates of reorganized firms is challenging because of limited firm -specific market -based information and the oft -conflicting incentives of claimholders. We examine the role of industry peer information in reducing misvaluations and its implications for unintended interclaimant wealth transfers and postreorganization performance. First, we find that the availability of r...
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作者：Rodriguez, Arturo Estrada; Ibrahim, Rouba; Zhan, Dongyuan
作者单位：Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; University of London; University College London
摘要：Queues where people misreport their private information to access service faster are everywhere. Motivated by the prevalence of such behavior in practice, we construct a queueing-game-theoretic model where customers make strategic claims to reduce their waiting time and where the manager decides on the static scheduling policy based on those claims to minimize the expected delay cost in the system. We develop a lying-aversion model where customers incur both delay and lying costs. We run contr...
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作者：Haeckl, Simone; Rege, Mari
作者单位：Universitetet i Stavanger
摘要：We conduct a field experiment in a large corporation to investigate the effects of supportive leadership behaviors on employee satisfaction, engagement, and performance. Treated leaders receive a brief training promoting leadership behaviors that encourage, assure, and value employee efforts. Our experimental design allows us to observe leaders and employees in a subsequent meeting. We find that the leadership training affects the leaders' supportive behaviors and thereby increases employees' ...
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作者：Quispe-Torreblanca, Edika; Gathergood, John; Loewenstein, George; Stewart, Neil
作者单位：University of Leeds; University of Oxford; University of Nottingham; Carnegie Mellon University; University of Warwick
摘要：Using data from an online brokerage, we examine the role of investor logins in trading behavior. We find that a new reference point is created when an investor logs in and views the investor's portfolio. We observe this as a disposition effect on returns since last login in addition to the traditional disposition effect on returns since purchase. Further, these reference points produce a strong interaction such that even a small loss since last login nullifies the positive effect of a gain sin...
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作者：Wan, Jiayue; Zhang, Yujia; Frazier, Peter I.
作者单位：Cornell University; Cornell University
摘要：Population-wide screening is a powerful tool for controlling infectious diseases. Group testing can enable such screening despite limited resources. Viral concentration of pooled samples are often positively correlated, either because prevalence and sample collection are influenced by location, or through intentional enhancement via pooling samples according to risk or household. Such correlation is known to improve efficiency when test sensitivity is fixed. However, in reality, a test's sensi...
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作者：Chuk, Elizabeth; Lourie, Ben; Yoo, Il Sun
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa
摘要：We examine whether buyers reduce their late payments in response to a regulatory change in the United Kingdom that mandates the public disclosure of their payment practices. We find that UK buyers subject to this regulation reduce their late payments. In cross-sectional tests, we find that this reduction in late payments is more pronounced for buyers with a greater extent of late payments, buyers facing a more concentrated supplier base, and buyer-supplier relationships in which a supplier is ...
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作者：Huang, Ni; Burtch, Gordon; Chen, Pei-yu; Huang, Ao
作者单位：University of Miami; Boston University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Matching platforms seek to facilitate market clearing, but congestion arises with imbalances in supply and demand. In online labor markets, when workers can apply to jobs without restriction, they may apply to an excessive volume of positions to maximize their likelihood of securing work, overwhelming employers and making screening difficult if not altogether unmanageable. Prior research has theoretically argued that imposing application costs on workers can mitigate this issue. However, the e...
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作者：Nageswaran, Leela; Jain, Aditya; Gurnani, Haresh
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：A retailer can insist on a guaranteed margin contract with its supplier, wherein it requires a margin on each sale. In addition, it may want to have the lowest selling price in a market with competing retailers, and if this strategy of offering the lowest price reduces its margin, the supplier must pay up the difference. There has been recent debate on whether this approach leads to anticompetitive behavior with elevated retail prices, monopolistic market, or diminished market coverage. We ana...
