The Check Is in the Mail: Can Disclosure Reduce Late Payments to Suppliers?

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Chuk, Elizabeth; Lourie, Ben; Yoo, Il Sun
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.06586
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: SMALL BUSINESS; Enterprise and Employment Act; Disclosure regulation; late payments; payment practices; Trade credit

摘要

We examine whether buyers reduce their late payments in response to a regulatory change in the United Kingdom that mandates the public disclosure of their payment practices. We find that UK buyers subject to this regulation reduce their late payments. In cross-sectional tests, we find that this reduction in late payments is more pronounced for buyers with a greater extent of late payments, buyers facing a more concentrated supplier base, and buyer-supplier relationships in which a supplier is more important to a buyer than other suppliers. In additional tests, we document evidence consistent with increases in contracting costs for late payers after the disclosure of late payments. Specifically, we find that late-paying buyers experience (i) a loss of suppliers and (ii) a negative stock market reaction. Finally, for buyers subject to the regulation, we document a decrease in operating cash flows, increase in debt, decrease in investment, and decrease in future profitability. Our findings that the disclosure of late payments contains decision-useful information can inform standard-setters, as the FASB and IASB recently mandated new disclosures related to trade credit but omitted mandates for disclosures related to late payments.