-
作者：Incekara-Hafalir, Elif; Lee, Grace H. Y.; Siah, Audrey K. L.; Xiao, Erte
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Monash University; Monash University Malaysia; Monash University
摘要：Achieving success often requires persistent effort. We study the effectiveness of two reward mechanisms, all-or-nothing and piece-rate, to incentivize full completion of repeated tasks over time. Our theoretical analysis shows that exogenously imposing the all-or-nothing mechanism can be ineffective due to the potential discouragement effect. In contrast, empowering individuals to choose between the two reward mechanisms can significantly improve the full completion rate. Data from a series of...
-
作者：Thakor, Richard T.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Financing frictions may create a misallocation of assets in a market, thus depressing output, productivity, and asset values. This paper empirically explores how liquidity shocks generate a reallocation that diminishes this misallocation. Using a unique data set of agricultural outcomes, I explore how farmers respond to a relaxation of financial constraints through a liquidity shock unrelated to farming fundamentals, namely exogenous cash inflows caused by an expansion of hydraulic fracturing ...
-
作者：Anunrojwong, Jerry; Iyer, Krishnamurthy; Manshadi, Vahideh
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Yale University
摘要：We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in social services catering to users with varied levels of need. In the absence of price discrimination and centralized admission, the provider relies on sharing information about wait times to improve welfare. We consider a stylizedmodelwith heterogeneous userswho differ in their private outside options: low-need users have an acceptable outside option to the social service, whereas high-need users have no viable outside ...
-
作者：Tergiman, Chloe; Villeval, Marie Claire
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：In a finitely repeated game with asymmetric information, we experimentally study how individuals adapt the nature of their lies when settings allow for reputation building. Although some lies can be detected ex post by the uninformed party, others remain deniable. We find that traditional market mechanisms, such as reputation, generate strong changes in the way people lie and lead to strategies in which individuals can maintain plausible deniability; people simply hide their lies better by sub...
-
作者：Kokkodis, Marios; Ransbothama, Sam
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：Hiring in online labor markets involves considerable uncertainty: which hiring choices are more likely to yield successful outcomes and how do employers adjust their hiring behaviors to make such choices? We argue that employers will initially explore the value of available information. When employers observe successful outcomes, they will keep reinforcing their hiring strategies; but when the outcomes are unsuccessful, employers will adjust their hiring behaviors. To investigate these dynamic...
-
作者：Ma, Will
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：who will purchase at most one. Typically, retailers select a subset of items, corresponding to an assortment of brands to carry, and make each selected item available for purchase at its brand-recommended price. Despite the tremendous importance in practice, the best method for selling these fixed-price items is not well understood, as retailers have begun experimenting with making certain items available only through a lottery. In this paper, we analyze the maximum possible revenue that can b...
-
作者：Bu, Jinzhi; Simchi-Levi, David; Wang, Li
作者单位：Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study a single product pricing problem with demand censoring in an offline data-driven setting. In this problem, a retailer has a finite amount of inventory and faces a random demand that is price sensitive in a linear fashion with unknown price sensitivity and base demand distribution. Any unsatisfied demand that exceeds the inventory level is lost and unobservable. We assume that the retailer has access to an offline data set consisting of triples of historical price, inventory level, and...
-
作者：Feldman, Pnina; Frazelle, Andrew E.; Swinney, Robert
作者单位：Boston University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Duke University
摘要：Restaurant delivery platforms collect customer orders via the Internet, transmit them to restaurants, and deliver the orders to customers. They provide value to restaurants by expanding their markets, but critics claim they destroy restaurant profits by taking a percentage of revenues and generating congestion that negatively impacts dine-in customers. We consider these tensions using a model of a restaurant as a congested service system. We find that the predominant industry contract, in whic...
-
作者：Itoh, Hideshi; Morita, Kimiyuki
作者单位：Waseda University
摘要：We study the value of divergence in values and preferences in organizations by combining three stages of a decision process-ex ante information acquisition, interim project choice, and ex post project execution-into a tractable model. A key insight is that our unified model provides predictions different from models without the execution decision stage. We consider an organization that consists of a decision maker who selects a project and an implementer who acquires costly information before ...
-
作者：Simchi-Levi, David
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
